LSP4XML, the library used to parse
XML files in VSCode-XML, Eclipse’s wildwebdeveloper, theia-xml and more, was affected by an
XXE (CVE-2019-18213) which lead to
RCE (CVE-2019-18212) exploitable by just opening a malicious
2019 seems to be XXE’s year: during the latest Penetration Tests we successfully exploited a fair amount of
XXEs, an example being https://www.shielder.com/blog/exploit-apache-solr-through-opencms/.
It all started during a web application penetration test, while I was trying to exploit a
blind XXE with zi0black. We started with a standard
XXE payload with an external
DTD pointing to our listening web-server; we knew the target server couldn’t perform
HTTP requests to the internet, so we were expecting only a
DNS interaction, but then we received two different
DNS interactions and one
HTTP request… What the Phrack?!
While trying to find out the cause of the interactions we noticed that the
HTTP request was coming from our own
IP address, which was weird: did someone just own herself?!
In order to investigate such behavior we replayed all the steps using a fresh Burp Collaborator instance as callback server and WAT?! when we saved the new
XML payload in Visual Studio Code the
XXE was triggered.
At this point we were like “ok, we’re doing something wrong, it’s impossible that this is the default VS Code behavior and we never noticed previously ”.
We checked the VS Code configuration to understand why it was happening and we noticed that the XML Language Support extension by RedHat was installed, which is the one VS Code suggests you to install when opening an
XML file for the first time.
Using a very naive approach we disabled the extension to verify it was the root-cause and replicated the steps, and yes that was the case!
XML Language Support extension (a.k.a.
VSCode-XML) allows you to open
XSD files and parse them for syntax errors, but more importantly validates
XSTL files against
By analysing the extension code it’s easy to understand that it is merely a dummy-client, all the juicy
XML parsing is done by the LSP4XML Language Server.
It turned out that the
XXE vulnerability lied in
LSP4XML itself: when opening an
XML file inside Visual Studio Code with
VSCode-XML installed, every time the file is edited or saved,
LSP4XML parses the file locally and reports any error(s) in the VS Code interface.
Ok nice, we have found an
XXE that it’s triggered on file open, but can we weaponize this vulnerability?
We tried common OOB exfiltration tricks used in such situations, but everything failed due to the combination of a recent Java version (1.8+) and URI parsing.
The only things we could perform were:
While playing with the
XXE we noticed a strange (and pretty boring) behavior: URLs are retrieved only once. It was obvious that some kind of caching system could have been in place, so probably our files, referenced as
DTDs, are downloaded and stored somewhere… what could go wrong?
The caching procedure works in this way:
Wait a second. We can fully control the path of the file, what would happen if the external entity URL contained a
../ in the path?
You guessed it! The caching procedure is vulnerable to a Path Traversal while saving the cache file, which results in the ability to write an arbitrary remote file in an arbitrary local directory. 🤯
The procedure is also so kind to create the folder structure we need if it’s not already there.
The vulnerability is in the very last step of the caching procedure, where the
$path_of_file is not sanitized, so if the URL of the external entity is
http://attack.er/../../../../Desktop/test.txt the cache file will be written to
$HOME/Desktop/test.txt, which is basically an arbitrary file write. The only limitations are that it’s impossible to overwrite any file due to point 3 of the parsing procedure and obviously everything is done with the current user privilege set (so if the current user is an administrator we can write anywhere, otherwise only in her home / world-writable directories).
Now we can easily achieve RCE by abusing the Startup/Autostart mechanism:
Now we just need to wait for the victim to logout and login again on her machine to obtain code execution!
After finishing our exploit chain for
LSP4XML, we checked who is using that library besides
VSCode-XML and we found that also Eclipse’s wildwebdeveloper extension and theia-xml-extension are vulnerable – and probably many more!
Here are the steps to exploit the XXE and achieve RCE on both Windows and GNU/Linux systems:
whoamicommand is executed, on GNU/Linux a “Terminal” is opened and the
idcommand is executed)
Finding and exploiting these vulnerabilities was really fun, not just because the first one was spotted only by chance
¯\_(ツ)_/¯, but also because pwning a library used in many big projects is always satisfying!
If you are using
LSP4XML in one of your projects update it to version 0.9.1.
If you need to reference these vulnerabilities you can use the following CVEs:
24 ottobre 2019
Sono thezero, Security Researcher e Senior Penetration Tester in Shielder.
In ufficio sono quello che usa il saldatore. Non solvo nessuna Crypto.
Sono zi0black, Security Researcher e Penetration Tester presso Shielder. Mi piace trasformare i dispositivi IoT in costosi fermacarte.